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Abstract
Academics, the media, and policymakers have all raised concerns about the implications of human
workers being replaced by machines or software. Few have discussed the implications of the reverse:
firms’ ability to replace capital with workers. We show that this flexibility can help new firms over-
come uncertainty and increase entrepreneurial entry. We develop a simple real options model where
permissive labor regulations allow firms to take advantage of capital-labor substitutability by replacing
’rigid’ capital with ’flexible’ labor. The model highlights institutional, technological, and organizational
preconditions to using this flexibility. Using a large and comprehensive dataset on entry by standalone
firms and group a liates, we provide evidence in support of the model.
Keywords: entry, irreversibility, investment under uncertainty, real options, organizational forms.
JEL Classification: L22, L23, K22.
1
1 Introduction
The possibility of firms replacing workers with technology has recently received a lot of attention from
academics, the media, and policymakers. The bulk of this conversation has been about the potential
impact on jobs and employees’ wages (e.g. Autor et al., 2003; Graetz & Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu &
Restrepo, 2018; Felten et al., 2019) or the possibility that increased returns to scale will lead to fewer,
bigger, and more powerful firms (e.g. Autor et al., 2017).
To date, little attention has been paid to the reverse possibility: that workers can replace capital. We
suggest that this possibility actually has important strategic implications. Specifically, we suggest that
this substitutability can increase entry by new firms by helping them cope with uncertainty.
Potential entrepreneurs may be dissuaded from entering an uncertain market if they have to make
major sunk investments (Myers, 1977; Dixit, 1989, 1992; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Kogut, 1991; Miller &
Folta, 2002; Bloom, 2009; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). Scholars describe this as the threshold return or
“hurdle” rate justifying investment being higher if the investment cannot be recovered or are costly to
terminate.
However, entrepreneurs may tolerate uncertainty if they can easily scale operations up or down. A
flexible labor market that allows “labor on demand”, for example, can reduce the downside risk of entry.
Rigid inputs like a factory built to specifications, on the other hand, exacerbate the cost of uncertainty.
We suggest that the ability to substitute labor and capital allows firms to take advantage of whichever
input is more flexible.1
Not all firms are equally able to take advantage of capital-labor substitutability, though. Access to at
least one flexible input is necessary to benefit. We show that firms in countries with permissive labor laws
are more responsive to capital-labor substitutability. This e↵ect is driven by standalone firms. Multi-unit
organizations instead can use their internal markets to redeploy underused inputs, which gives them an
alternative way to cope with input rigidity and uncertainty.
Specifically, we show evidence consistent with standalone entrants using exploratory labor-intensive
strategies taking advantage of labor flexibility to cheaply test the market before committing to large
capital expenditures. Because capital investment is often highly specific and irreversible, at least in
the early stages of production, firms may substitute “rigid” but potentially more e cient capital with
more “flexible” labor. The relationship between uncertainty and factor flexibility was first studied by
Rothschild & Stiglitz (1971)2 and there are a number of well-known examples of experimental entry
with labor-intensive production actually occurring, with a plan to later convert to more e cient capital-
intensive production. For example, Chinese manufacturer BYD was able to enter the capital-intensive
battery industry with a relatively labor-intensive production process. Once the firm understood demand,
it began investing in physical capital to get more e cient (Huckman & MacCormack, 2006). Online
1For example, the Financial Times suggested that “The jobs-rich, investment-lite nature of the UK economy reflects a shift
in behaviour by companies. Some are concluding that it is easier to add jobs that can be cut rather than make irreversible
investments in capital equipment.”(Financial Times, 2019).
2Rothschild & Stiglitz (1971) examine, among other things, how demand uncertainty a↵ects input choices (in particular,
capital-labor ratios) when capital cannot be varied in the short run but labor can.
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question-answering service Aardvark famously began testing demand for its product by having people
manually answer questions with the intent to develop machine-learning algorithms to scale the process
and automatically answer questions if—and only if—demand was proven (Eisenmann et al., 2011).
An alternative strategy to cope with uncertainty is to rely on internal market flexibility. Internal
market flexibility refers to the ability of multi-unit organizations such as conglomerates and corporate
groups to redeploy production inputs from units where they are no longer needed to units where they
are needed. For instance, as a response to declining demand and increasing competitive pressure in the
early 1990s, Volkswagen relocated employees across plants and geographical locations to avoid dismissals
(Kothen et al., 1999). Internal market flexibility may thus be a source of competitive advantage for multi-
unit organizations, particularly when markets are rigid and uncertainty pervasive (Foote & Folta, 2003;
Belenzon & Tsolmon, 2016; Cestone et al., 2016; Kim & Kung, 2016; Sakhartov & Folta, 2014; Lieberman
et al., 2017).
To fix ideas, we build a simple model of investment under uncertainty where both these strategies—
exploratory and internal market flexibility—play an important role. The model makes predictions con-
cerning both the rate and mode of entry, and relates these predictions to institutional, technological, and
organizational factors. In particular, we show that the exploratory strategy of entering with ine ciently
high levels of labor and low levels of capital is valuable especially to standalone (single-unit) firms, and
when substituting capital with labor is relatively easy, from a technological standpoint. If demand is
proven, standalones begin to invest more in capital and gradually become more capital-intensive. By con-
trast, multi-unit organizations cope with rigidities and uncertainty by relying on internal market flexibility.
They make little use of the exploratory, labor-intensive strategy. They start relatively capital-intensive,
and hence their capital-labor ratios change little over their lifecycle.
The main contribution of this paper is to bring these predictions to the data. We operationalize
the flexibility of labor with OECD measures of employment protection law rigidity (EPL) and the sub-
stitutability of labor and capital with estimates from Chirinko & Mallick (2017). Consistent with the
predictions of the model, we find that (i) firm entry is highest when labor is flexible and (ii) that e↵ect is
moderated by the substitutability of labor for capital. Moreover, (iii) when factors are substitutable and
labor is flexible, firms enter with lower capital-labor ratios and then substitute labor for capital as they
age and uncertainty is resolved, indicative of an exploratory strategy. Also consistent with the predictions
of the model, (iv) entry by group a liates, which can redeploy inputs internally, is less a↵ected by labor
rigidity, factor substitutability, and uncertainty, (v) group a liates are on average more capital-intensive
than standalone firms, and (vi) their capital-labor ratios change less over their lifecycle.
The paper makes several empirical contributions to real options theory and the strategy literature.
Much of the literature on entry in strategy and economics models the choice of a potential market entrant
as a comparison of the expected benefits of entry with the expected costs of entry. A growing literature,
however, suggests that knowing precisely one’s own potential profitability is impossible because of the
complexity of what determines profitability (e.g., Kerr et al., 2014) and having to learn about one’s own
fit with the market (Jovanovic, 1982). If that is the case, rather than generating a full plan for market
entry to maximize expected profit, firms may enter as part of an “experiment”. As conceptualized in
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the search literature (e.g., Levinthal & March, 1993), entrants try out strategies, learn from them, and
adjust. This idea is captured in the popular press through suggestions that entrants begin “lean” (Ries,
2011), entering with a “minimum viable product” and adapting to new information as it arises.
A well-known problem is that, when the choice of inputs is at least partly irreversible, the cost of
terminating an “experiment” is higher, and this can hinder investment and entry. Our specific theoret-
ical contribution is to highlight technological and organizational factors that moderate the relationship
between uncertainty, irreversibility, and investment/entry. In particular, we provide initial empirical
demonstration of the importance of factor substitutability and internal markets in allowing organizations
to undertake “cheap experiments”. The real options literature also largely focuses on explaining rates of
investment and entry in an industry. The present paper provides a more comprehensive view, for we also
analyze modes of entry (labor- vs. capital-intensive production strategies) and the comparative advantage
of di↵erent organizational forms (standalones vs. corporate groups).
Industry life cycle models such the as the Abernathy-Utterback model (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975;
Abernathy & Utterback, 1978) and Klepper (1996) focus on patterns of entry, exit, and R&D investment
as an industry evolves. These models suggests that firms will become more capital-intensive over time as
fears of displacement by new products subside, scale economies become more important, and attention
shifts to production process e ciency. Our model di↵ers from industry life cycle models because our focus
is on technology choices over a firm’s life cycle. In particular, our model predicts di↵erential adjustment
by new firms relative to incumbents at any given stage of the industry life cycle.
Bloom et al. (2007) and Stein & Stone (2013) are recent empirical studies that demonstrate the
adverse e↵ects of uncertainty on a number of firm policies including spending on physical assets, R&D,
hiring, and advertising campaigns. Bornha¨ll et al. (2017) examine the e↵ects of a sudden change in
labor regulation in Sweden, and show that employment protection law can act as a growth barrier for
small firms.3 Uncertainty and irreversibility have also been shown to be important determinants of firms’
entry and exit decisions (O’Brien et al., 2003; O’Brien & Folta, 2009; Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Ghosal,
1996, 2009). Several papers highlight the importance of manufacturing or operations flexibility (Jain
et al., 2013; Kulatilaka, 1988, 1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Goyal & Netessine, 2007). Beyond case
studies, however, the evidence on these issues is limited (Fisher & Ittner, 1999; Beach et al., 2000; Gopal
et al., 2013). We provide large-scale evidence that the ability to switch to a more flexible, labor-intensive
production strategy promotes business creation.
Regarding organizational form, real options theory stresses the benefits of collaborative ventures in
providing flexible arrangement for dealing with uncertainty (Kogut, 1991; Chi & Maguire, 1996; Chi,
2000; Kouvelis et al., 2001; Folta & Miller, 2002; Vassolo et al., 2004; Reuer & Tong, 2010). The present
paper emphasizes the flexibility of multi-unit organizations originating from their internal markets, rather
than the option to expand or acquire embedded in collaborative ventures. In that respect, the present
paper shares similarities with work in international business stressing the flexibility of multinational
organizations to shift production across plants and countries as economic conditions change (e.g., Kogut
3Other papers documenting the e↵ects of labor rigidities on firm entry and size include Davis & Henrekson (1999),
Davidsson & Henrekson (2002), and Autor et al. (2007).
4
& Kulatilaka, 1994; Folta et al., 2016). Our evidence suggests that internal market flexibility matters in
explaining di↵erential rates and modes of entry by standalones and group a liates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple real options model that
highlights how the choice among production strategies is a↵ected by institutional, technological, and
organizational factors. This section develops the key hypotheses that are tested in the empirical anal-
ysis. Section 3 presents the data, while Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarizes the key
contributions of the paper to strategy research and concludes.
2 Model
In this model we examine how the ability of a prospective firm to flexibly adjust its initial input choices
a↵ects its propensity to enter a market and production strategy. The main finding from our analysis
is that, when inputs are subject to very di↵erent adjustment costs, then a firm can find it optimal
to enter with a production strategy that is biased towards the more flexible input, even if this input-
biased production strategy involves ine ciencies. Multi-unit organizations, however, may be able to
avoid such ine cient technological choices, thanks to their ability to redeploy even rigid inputs within
their boundaries comparatively cheaply.
Though the model is more general, in outlining the empirical implications of the model, we assume
that capital is always more rigid, while labor may or may not be rigid. Thus, our empirical focus is on the
trend toward more flexible labor. Assuming that capital is rigid is probably a fair assumption for now,
but may not be so in the future. For example, Bennett & Hall (2019) suggest that softwarization leads
to patterns consistent with increasing capital flexibility. Thus, the generality of the theoretical model,
where either input can be the more flexible one, may prove valuable for future research as well.
3 Economic environment
We consider a model where demand is initially uncertain and a firm that enters produces for two periods.
In the first period, the firm makes an initial choice of inputs, produces, and learns about demand. In the
second period, the firm adjusts its choice of inputs and produces again. We are interested in situations
where the firm’s choice of inputs is partially irreversible or “rigid”, meaning that a subsequent decision
to reduce the amount of input may be subject to adjustment costs. For instance, in the case of labor
inputs, partial irreversibility may originate from severance payments, unemployment benefits or by less
tangible costs such as loss of morale for the remaining workers. In the case of capital inputs, transaction
costs or investment specificity may constrain a firm’s ability to downsize, as the selling price of capital is
typically lower than the buying price.
We assume that the firm produces using two inputs, capital K and labor L. To capture partial
irreversibility in the choice of inputs, we posit that if labor is reduced by one unit from period 1 to period
2, then the firm incurs an adjustment cost cL. Similarly, if capital is reduced by one unit from period 1
to period 2, then the firm incurs an adjustment cost cK . For simplicity, we assume that cL and cK can
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only take two values: 0 or c > 0. We say that labor is flexible if cL = 0 and rigid if cL = c. Similarly,
we say that capital is flexible if cK = 0 and rigid if cK = c. Thus, we consider four possible scenarios:
(cK , cL) = (0, 0), (cK , cL) = (c, 0), (cK , cL) = (0, c) and (cK , cL) = (c, c). These scenarios are illustrated
in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Output can be produced using two di↵erent technologies. T1(k1, l1) = min{k1, l1} is a Leontief or
perfect complements technology where capital k1 and labor l1 must be used together in fixed proportions
(one unit of capital with one unit of labor). T2(k2, l2) =
↵
2 (k2 + l2) is a linear or perfect substitutes
technology where capital k2 and labor l2 can be freely substituted at a constant rate (in our case, one-
for-one). The firm can produce some output using one technology, and some output using the other
technology. Thus, the firm’s production function is:
q (k1, l1, k2, l2) = T1(k1, l1) + T2(k2, l2) (1)
= min{k1, l1}+ ↵
2
(k2 + l2)
where K = k1 + k2 is the total amount of capital used in production and L = l1 + l2 is the total amount
labor used. The parameter ↵ is a measure of the e ciency of T2 relative to T1, and we assume ↵ 2 [0, 1).
In choosing whether to produce with T1 or T2, the firm faces a trade-o↵ between e ciency and input
flexibility. T2 has an advantage over T1 in terms of input flexibility because T2 allows the firm to use
di↵erent combinations of capital and labor, not just fixed proportions as T1. Thus, any cost asymmetry
or friction that hinders the use of one input relative to the other will tend to favor the use of T2.
On the other had, technology T1 can enjoy an e ciency advantage. If the firm employs one unit
of capital and one unit of labor, it can produce one unit of output using T1, but only ↵ < 1 units of
output using T2. If ↵ is su ciently small, only the perfect complements technology T1 (with elasticity of
substitution   = 0) will be used in the optimum.
Because high values of ↵ make the perfect substitutes technology T2 more attractive, and the perfect
complements technology T1 less attractive, we can also associate higher values of ↵ with higher observed
levels of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Indeed, plants using the high elasticity
of substitution technology T2 (  = +1) will be more common when ↵ is large, and plants using the low
elasticity of substitution technology T1 (  = 0) will be more common when ↵ is small.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the rental price of capital r and the wage rate w are equal
(r = w) and we normalize them to 1. Together, r = w and ↵ < 1 imply that technology T1 with a
balanced combination of capital and labor (k1 = l1) is the least expensive way to produce one unit of
output. For this reason, we will often refer to T1 as the e cient, input-balanced technology.
We write p to denote the price of output and assume p   2 (= r + w), so that the firm can make a
nonnegative profit.
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3.1 Timing
The timing of the model is as follows.
At period 0 (the entry phase), the firm chooses whether to enter or not. If it does not enter, it makes
zero profits and the game ends. If it enters, it pays a fixed entry cost F and demand Q for the firm
is realized. Demand is high, m +  /2, with probability 1/2 , and low, m    /2, with probability 1/2 .
  2 [0, 2m] is a parameter capturing the magnitude of the uncertainty shock (a mean preserving spread
of the product demand distribution). Demand for the firm’s output stays the same (high or low) in period
1 and 2.4
In period 1 (the learning phase), the firm selects an initial investment plan (k1, l1, k2, l2) without
knowing if demand is high or low. The firm produces using (k1, l1, k2, l2), demand is observed, and
period-1 profits accrue. Quantity sold is the minimum between q (k1, l1, k2, l2) and realized demand.
Thus, period-1 profits are pmin{q (k1, l1, k2, l2) ,m+ /2}  r[k1+ k2] w[l1+ l2] if demand is high, and
pmin{q (k1, l1, k2, l2) ,m  /2}  r[k1 + k2]  w[l1 + l2] if demand is low.
In Period 2 (the post-learning phase), the firm can update its initial investment plan depending
on observed demand. Let
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
be the updated investment plan when demand is high,
and
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
the updated investment plan when demand is low.5 Capital adjustment costs are
cK max{k0H1 + k0H2   k1   k2, 0} if demand is high, and cK max{k0L1 + k0L2   k1   k2, 0} if demand is low.
Labor adjustment costs are similarly defined.6 The firm produces using the updated investment plan and
period-2 profits accrue (these include adjustment costs).   2 [0, 1] is the discount factor between period
2 and period 1.7
3.2 Production strategies
Because our assumptions imply that the most e cient way to produce one unit of output is to use
technology T1 with one unit of capital and labor, in the optimum the quantity m    /2 demanded for
sure in both periods will be produced using T1. The only interesting question is therefore how the firm
will serve the uncertain residual demand  . We distinguish three possible production strategies that the
firm may use in the learning phase, conditional on entry.
Starting small. The firm does not produce in period 1 beyond the quantity m    /2 demanded for
sure. That is, the firm selects (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m   /2,m   /2, 0, 0). A firm that starts small plans
4In reality, even incumbents face demand uncertainty. This formulation is meant to suggest that entrants face more
demand uncertainty.
5We assume that the firm observes whether demand is high or low regardless of the amount of output that the firm
produces. This is a reasonable assumption if uncertainty captures the e↵ects of macroeconomic shocks (e.g., the impact of
Brexit on British businesses) or the evolution of a particular industry. It is also a reasonable assumption if the demand for
a particular product can be gauged through interactions with existing customers, since at least quantity m  /2 is always
produced, conditional on entry.
6These specifications imply that capital or labor used with technology T1 can easily be redeployed for use with technology
T2, and vice versa. This assumption can easily be relaxed without changing the results of the paper.
7There is no discounting between period 1 and period 0.
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to grow if demand is proven high, but can remain small without incurring adjustment costs if demand is
proven low.
Starting large and e cient. The uncertain residual demand   is served using T1. That is, the firm
selects (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0). Intuitively, a firm that starts large and e cient is taking
a gamble. If demand is proven high, the firm makes a large profit because   is produced in both periods
at the lowest possible cost. However, if demand is proven low, the firm experiences overcapacity and may
incur large adjustment costs.
Exploratory (capital- or labor-intensive). The uncertain residual demand   is served using the
perfect substitutes technology T2. The firm can start either capital-intensive, (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m  
 /2,m  /2, 2↵ , 0), or labor-intensive, (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m  /2,m  /2, 0, 2↵ ). Intuitively, the firm
hires the factor that is more flexible to serve the uncertain demand  . For instance, if labor is the most
flexible input, the firm uses only labor to produce  : k2 = 0, l2 =
2
↵ . The advantage is that, if demand
turns out to be low, the firm can fire labor at little cost. The disadvantage is that, in period 1,   is not
produced at the lowest possible cost (because a balanced input combination with T1 is more e cient).8
In addition to these basic production strategies, the firm could also use “hybrid” strategies where, for
instance, only a fraction of the uncertain demand is served or the firm produces   using both T1 and T2.
While we allow for these hybrid strategies in the analysis below, because of the linearity of our problem
they generically will not be optimal.
3.3 Analysis
We begin by assuming that in period 0 the firm pays the fixed cost F and enters the market. Thus, our
focus will be on production strategies, conditional on entry.
We distinguish between two types of input rigidity: costly adjustment and irreversibility. Suppose the
firm wants to reduce labor in period 2 (the case of capital is analogous). If c < 1, then the cost of firing
workers is less than the cost of keeping them for one more period, because w = 1. Thus, the firm will
fire the workers it does not need (the costly adjustment case). However, if c   1, the firm will not reduce
labor in period 2, because adjustment costs are too high (the input irreversibility case). Thus, without
loss of generality, we can restrict attention to adjustment costs such that c 2 [0, 1] in the following. c = 0
corresponds to the full flexibility benchmark. c 2 (0, 1) refers to the costly adjustment case. c = 1 refers
to the irreversibility care. Adjustment costs cannot be higher than 1 because the firm has always the
option to retain inputs in period 2.
Lemma 1 characterizes the firm’s optimal production strategies when adjustment costs are symmetric:
cK = cL (Scenarios 1 and 4 in Table 1).
8In principle, it could also be that, once a firm has started with T2 and a very labor-intensive strategy, it does not find
it optimal to switch to T1 and a more balanced input mix, because this would involve significant labor adjustment cost.
However, this cannot happen in the optimum. The reason is that the labor-intensive strategy is only selected when labor
is flexible, and in that case cL = 0. Thus, very low adjustment costs in the input flexibility case allow us to rule out some
cases. However, our results would qualitatively hold even if this assumption was relaxed.
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Lemma 1 (Scenarios 1 and 4). Suppose adjustment costs are symmetric, cK = cL = c 2 [0, 1], and
the firm enters in period 0.
(i). If p < 4 + 2 c, then in period 0 the firm starts small: (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m    /2,m    /2, 0, 0).
In period 1, production is adjusted depending on the realized state of demand. If demand is low the
firm remains small:
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m  /2,m  /2, 0, 0). If demand is high, the firm grows
and becomes large and e cient:
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
= (m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0).
(ii). If p   4 + 2 c, then in period 0 the firm starts large and e cient: (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m+ /2,m+
 /2, 0, 0). In period 1, production is adjusted depending on the realized state of demand. If demand
is low and c < 1 the firm downsizes:
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m    /2,m    /2, 0, 0). If demand is
high (or c = 1), the firm remains large and e cient:
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
= (m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0).
The intuition for these results is simple. As mentioned above, because the minimum amount of output
m    /2 is always demanded, this output is optimally produced using the e cient, input-balanced
technology T1. Thus, k1   m  /2 and l1   m  /2.
The firm must also decide how to serve the residual uncertain demand  . Lemma 1 states that in
period 1 the residual demand   is either not served (the firm starts “small”) or is fully served using
the e cient technology T1 (the firm starts “large and e cient”). The advantage of the starting small
strategy is that, in period 2 (the post-learning phase), the firm can tailor production to the realized state
of demand, without having to incur adjustment costs. The firm can remain small if demand is low, and
can grow if demand is high. The drawback is that demand may not be fully served in period 1 (the
learning phase) if it happens to be high. Conversely, the starting large and e cient strategy allows the
firm to fully serve demand in period 1 if it is high. However, if demand is low, the firm will experience
overcapacity and may have to incur large adjustment costs.
The firm is more likely to start small if output price p is low and the future is important (  large).
In this case, the lower revenues associated with not fully serving demand in period 1 are less salient. The
firm is also more likely to start small if adjustment costs c are large. This captures a core intuition of real
options theory: under conditions of uncertainty, rigidities tend to hamper investment and growth.
The key feature of Lemma 1 is that, when adjustment costs are symmetric, the exploratory (capital-
or labor-intensive) strategy is never used: k2 = l2 = 0. There is no reason to substitute a balanced, cost-
minimizing combination of inputs k1 = l1 with either a capital-intensive or a labor-intensive production
strategy when inputs are equally rigid. Indeed, even adjustment costs are lower with e cient, input-
balanced technology T1 than with T2. In the former case, in fact, adjustment costs per unit of output
are 2c (the firm must reduce both k1 and l1 by one unit); with T2, adjustment costs are (2/↵)c, which is
bigger than 2c (because 2/↵ inputs must be used to produce one unit of output).
However, as Lemma 2 below shows, a capital- or labor-intensive exploratory strategy can be optimal
when adjustment costs are asymmetric. Lemma 2 focuses on the case where labor is flexible but capital is
rigid (Scenario 3). In this case, it can be optimal to test demand with a strategy that takes advantage of
9
labor flexibility. The case when capital is flexible but labor is rigid (Scenario 2) is completely analogous
and thus omitted.
Lemma 2 (Scenario 3). Suppose labor is flexible but capital is rigid: cL = 0, cK = c 2 (0, 1]. Suppose
also the firm enters in period 0.
(i). If p < min{ 4↵ , 4+ c}, then in period 0 the firm starts small: (k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m  /2,m  /2, 0, 0).
In period 1, production is adjusted depending on the realized state of demand. If demand is low the
firm remains small:
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m  /2,m  /2, 0, 0). If demand is high, the firm grows
and becomes large and e cient:
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
= (m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0).
(ii). If 4↵ < 4 +  c and p   4↵ , then in period 0 the firm selects the exploratory labor-intensive strategy:
(k1, l1, k2, l2) = (m    /2,m    /2, 0, 2↵ ). In period 1, production level is adjusted depending
on the realized state of demand. If demand is low the firm downsizes by firing the l2 workers: 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m  /2,m  /2, 0, 0). If demand is high, the firm maintains its production
level but switches to a more e cient and capital-intensive production strategy:
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
=
(m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0).
(iii). If 4↵   4 +  c and p   4 +  c, then in period 0 the firm starts large and e cient: (k1, l1, k2, l2) =
(m +  /2,m +  /2, 0, 0). In period 1, production is adjusted depending on the realized state of
demand. If demand is low, the firm downsizes:
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m    /2,m    /2, 0, 0) if
c < 1, or
 
k0L1 , l0L1 , k0L2 , l0L2
 
= (m+ /2,m  /2, 0, 0) if c = 1. If demand is high, the firm remains
large and e cient:
 
k0H1 , l0H1 , k0H2 , l0H2
 
= (m+ /2,m+ /2, 0, 0).
When adjustment costs are asymmetric, it can be optimal to test demand with a capital- or labor-intensive
exploratory strategy. For instance, when labor is the more flexible input, as in Proposition 2, the firm
may find it optimal to produce the uncertain output   using T2 with only labor: k2 = 0 and l2 =
2
↵ .
Compared to the e cient technology T1, producing with T2 is more expensive but, because T2 makes
greater use of the more flexible input (in this case, labor), adjustment costs are lower. Indeed, with T2
adjustment costs per unit of output are 2↵cL = 0, whereas with T1 they are cK + cL = c.
Of course, when capital is the more flexible input (Scenario 2), an entirely symmetric situation arises,
and the firm can find it optimal to produce   using the perfect substitutes technology T2 with only
capital: k2 =
2
↵  and l2 = 0.
3.4 Testable predictions
Several testable predictions follow from our analysis. We begin by examining the e↵ects of greater labor
flexibility on the entry and production decisions of standalone firms. Then, we analyze the benefits of
internal market flexibility in large, multi-unit organizations.
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3.4.1 The e↵ects of labor flexibility on entry and production strategy
In the following, we take as our starting point the case where both capital and labor are rigid (Scenario
4). Then greater labor flexibility means that labor adjustment costs cL drop from c > 0 to 0, while capital
adjustment costs cK stay at c.
Because some costs are lower, it is clear that firm’s profits conditional on entry are weakly higher
under flexible labor than under rigid labor. Thus, the firm is more likely to pay F and enter when labor
is more flexible.9
Lower labor adjustment costs increase the firm’s profits holding production strategy constant, for
instance if the firm always selects the starting large and e cient strategy (case (ii) in Proposition 1 and
case (iii) in Proposition 2). However, lower labor adjustment costs can also increase firm’s profits by
allowing the firm to change its production strategy, specifically by switching to the exploratory, labor-
intensive strategy (case (ii) in Proposition 2). This second benefit is large when the perfect substitutes
technology T2 is not too ine cient; that is, when it is relatively inexpensive to substitute capital with
labor (↵ large).
Hypothesis 1 (Entry). Entry is more likely when labor is flexible. The e↵ect of greater labor flexibility
on entry is larger when substituting capital with labor is easier.
By comparing Propositions 1 and 2, it is clear that the exploratory labor-intensive strategy is only
selected when labor is flexible and the perfect substitutes technology T2 is not too ine cient (↵ large).
Thus, firms may be expected to exhibit higher labor-capital ratios when labor is flexible and it is relatively
easy to substitute capital with labor.
Hypothesis 2 (Labor-capital ratios). Firms’ labor-capital ratios are higher when labor is flexible and
substituting capital with labor is easy.
Propositions 1 and 2 can also be used to characterize how labor-capital ratios evolve over a firm’s
lifecycle. Proposition 1 predicts that, when labor and capital are equally rigid, the firm will only use the
e cient, input-balanced technology T1, both in period 1 and 2. Thus, while the firm may increase or
decrease its output over time depending on demand, its labor-capital ratio will remain roughly constant.
By contrast, when labor is more flexible than capital (Proposition 2), the firm may initially test
demand with an exploratory, labor-intensive strategy (case (ii)). If demand turns our to be low, the
firm will reduce its labor inputs in period 2. If demand turns out to be high, the firm will upgrade its
technology and produce   using T1 and a balanced input mix. In either case, the firm will transition
more from a relatively labor-intensive production strategy in period 1 (the learning phase), to a more
capital-intensive strategy in period 2 (the post-learning phase).
Hypothesis 3 (Labor-capital ratios over a firm’s lifecycle). If labor and capital are equally rigid,
labor-capital ratios remain approximately constant over a firm’s lifecycle. When labor is flexible but
9This and other implications of the model stated as empirical hypotheses below can easily be formally proven using the
model.
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capital is rigid, firms start relatively labor-intensive but, as they learn about demand, they switch to a
more capital-intensive production strategy.
In all scenarios, the quantitym  /2 demanded for sure is produced with the e cient, input-balanced
technology. With rigid capital, however, the uncertain demand   can be produced using the exploratory
labor-intensive strategy. Thus, when demand is more uncertain (as measured by  ), firms’ labor-capital
ratios tend to be higher (assuming that capital is always rigid).
Hypothesis 4 (Uncertainty and labor-capital ratios). When demand is more uncertain, firms
display higher labor-capital ratios.
3.4.2 The benefits of internal market flexibility
Next, we examine how the entry and production strategies of multi-unit organizations di↵er from those
of standalone firms. For concreteness and to better link the theoretical analysis to the empirical part, we
focus on one particular type of multi-unit organization—the corporate group.10
An important advantage of multi-unit organizations, relative to standalone firms, is that they enjoy
the benefits of internal market flexibility. They can redeploy inputs such as capital and labor from units
where they are no longer needed to units where they are needed if (if the units are su ciently similar to use
each others’ inputs). This suggests that, for group a liates, the adjustment costs c of reducing capital
and labor are significantly lower than for standalone firms, because excess resources can be internally
redeployed.1112
A key implication of lower adjustment costs is that, compared to standalone firms, group a liates are
less likely to select an exploratory strategy. Suppose for instance that capital is rigid but labor is flexible.
As Proposition 2(ii) shows, the exploratory labor-intensive strategy is only selected if 4↵ < 4 +  c. As c
decreases, this condition is less likely to hold, and hence the exploratory labor-intensive strategy is less
likely to be selected. Intuitively, because group a liates can cheaply redeploy excess resources internally,
rigidities in external capital and labor markets have little bearing on their production strategies. Group
a liates behave as if external markets were approximately flexible (cL and cK both close to zero). Note in
fact that, as c goes to zero, all our four scenarios converge to Scenario 1 where both inputs are flexible.13
Because group a liates can cheaply redeploy underused capital or labor when demand is low, their
incentives to enter new markets are greater than those of standalone firms. Their entry decisions are also
less likely to be a↵ected by factors such as uncertainty, input rigidities and factor substitutability, because
10Note that the corporate group is not the only multi-unit organization that benefits from internal flexibility. Indeed,
Penrose (1960) and Ahuja & Novelli (2016) make the case that even stand-alone firms can benefit from flexibility if they
enter new industries.
11When inputs are flexible, we assume that adjustment costs are zero both for group a liates and standalone firms.
12This assumption presumes some degree of diversification and lack of correlation in input needs among the units of the
group. Investigating these issues is an important direction for future work.
13Indeed, Propositions 1 and 2 are identical when c = 0 (in particular, case (ii) of Proposition 2 never arises because
4
↵ > 4).
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internal market flexibility reduces the costs associated with uncertainty and external market rigidities.
Lastly, because group a liates seldom select the labor-intensive exploratory strategy, they tend to be more
capital-intensive than standalones, and their capital-labor ratios tend to change less over their lifecycle.
Hypothesis 5 (Entry of group a liates). Compared to standalones, entry by group a liates is less
a↵ected by labor rigidity, factor substitutability and uncertainty.
Hypothesis 6 (Labor-capital ratios of group a liates). Group a liates are on average more
capital-intensive than standalones, and their labor-capital ratios change less over their life cycle.
Data
We construct our sample from the Bureau van Dijk’s (BvDEP) ORBIS ownership and financial database,
which provides wide and representative coverage of both private and public European companies. BvDEP
standardizes financial items across the various countries’ filing regulations and captures a wide range of
firm sizes. Figure 2 shows the number of entrants throughout the sample by country.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We augment the ORBIS data with data from external sources as described below.
In building our panel, we use yearly publications of ORBIS from 2002 to 2012. For each publication
year, we code firms as entrants if their date of incorporation is the same as the publication year. All other
firms are classified as incumbents. A unit of observation in our analysis is a country-industry-year triplet.
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The average number of firms in a country-industry-year triplet
is 2,051, of which 82 are entrants. We distinguish between two types of entrant: those that are a liated
with corporate groups (defined as in Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010) and standalones with no equity ties to
other firms. 12 percent of entrants are a liates; this rate is stable across industries.
[Insert Table 1]
Employment protection laws. Our measure of a country’s employment protection laws, EPL, is
the OECD employment dismissal protection index for the 2003-2010 period (OECD, 2013). This index
measures cross-country di↵erences in the di culty of dismissing workers. It is computed as the average
of five equally weighted dimensions, each ranging from 0 to 6: definition of justified or unfair dismissal
(REG5 ), length of trial period (REG6 ), compensation following unfair dismissal (REG7 ), possibility of
reinstatement following unfair dismissal (REG8 ), and maximum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal
(REG9 ). EPL varies significantly across countries, even within the OECD. For example, Belgium and
Portugal, which have comparable financial development as measured by the ratio of the total stock market
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value traded in the country to the country’s GDP—.57 and .65 on average over this period, respectively—
have dramatically di↵erent levels of employment protection—1.31 and 4.5 on average across this period,
respectively.14
Factor substitutability. The parameter ↵ in our model measures the e ciency of the high elasticity
of substitution (high  ) technology, relative to the low elasticity of substitution (low  ) technology. In
high ↵ industries a larger proportion of output is likely to be produced with high   production methods,
and hence we can proxy ↵ with measures of factor substitutability   at the industry level. Industries
with high substitutability are those in which laborers can be replaced by machinery, or vice versa. Road
paving is an example of a task with high substitutability. Law and oil refining, by contrast, have low
substitutability, with the former requiring labor that is irreplaceable by capital and the latter requiring
capital that is irreplaceable by labor.
Because factor substitutability has important implications for growth and income distribution, a large
literature has developed on how to estimate it (Chirinko, 2008). The standard approach leans heavily on
an assumed but rather general production function, which implies a rate of investment in the two factors
by a profit-maximizing firm investing in capital to make the relative price of capital equal its marginal
product. The empiricist then calibrates this model using data on the capital-to-output ratio and price of
capital.
Our industry-level factor substitutability estimates are from Chirinko & Mallick (2017), who use a low-
pass filter to isolate long-run components of data described in Jorgenson et al. (2000). A full description
of the process for producing these estimates is available in Chirinko & Mallick (2017). One virtue of
these estimates is that the technique is particularly well suited to identifying heterogeneity in factor
substitutability across industries, rather than creating a single economy-wide estimate.15
Corporate group a liation. Research suggests that one of the virtues of corporate group member-
ship is access to internal labor markets (Belenzon & Tsolmon, 2016) and internal capital markets (Belenzon
et al., 2013) as substitutes for weak domestic markets. Entering firms that are a liated with groups are
therefore likely to behave di↵erently from standalone entrants. To distinguish between standalone and
group-a liated firms, we use data from the ownership section of ORBIS.
Following Belenzon et al. (2013), we define a corporate group as a collection of at least two legally
distinct firms of which one is a controlling ultimate shareholder of the other or others. Firms are classified
as group a liates if any of the following are true: (a) the firm has a controlling parent company (it is
14Some employment protection laws only apply to firms above a certain size. An example of a threshold is in France at 10
employees, where employers must pay monthly rather than quarterly social security obligations, transport aid, and a higher
training tax (Garicano et al., 2016). Similarly, some employment protection laws (EPLs) in Sweden only a↵ect firms that
employ more than ten employees (Bornha¨ll et al., 2017).
Employment protection laws that only a↵ect very large firms should tend to reduce our estimated coe cients on EPL. If
entrants did not expect to grow beyond some minimum threshold, size contingent EPLs should have no e↵ect on their entry
decisions. Thus, if anything, our specifications tend to bias our results against finding any significant finding.
15In Appendix Table A3 we verify that our results are robust to the use of estimates of factor substitutability from
alternate sources. These alternate estimates are from Griliches & Ringstad (1971) and Young (2013), who estimates factor
substitutability from first order conditions in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function using data on
35 industries at roughly the 2-digit SIC level between 1960 and 2005. The estimates from Chirinko & Mallick (2017) are our
preferred estimates given the recency of the data and the superior industry coverage.
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a subsidiary), (b) it is a parent company of another firm (it has a subsidiary), or (c) it has the same
controlling shareholder as at least one other firm. We classify firms as standalone if they have no equity
ties to other firms or if their ownership information is missing. In the ORBIS data, this is operationalized
by defining firms as a liates if their independence score is a C or D. This operationalization is conservative
as some nongroup a liates may be able to benefit from flexibility and transfer factors between markets.
Also, some groups will have businesses that are not able to use each others’ inputs or face a high cost of
doing so Sakhartov (2017). These two facts bias us against finding results.
Uncertainty. Our uncertainty measure is the media Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from Baker
et al. (2016). The index is computed as a function of the number of terms in local newspapers that
indicate economic policy uncertainty.
Industry controls
Industry capital intensity. We calculate capital intensity as the log ratio of assets over employees over
the period 2002-2012 using the complete Amadeus database. Firm-year ratio values are averaged at the
4-digit NAICS level.
External capital dependence. The ability to substitute labor for capital is conceptually orthogonal
to the need for capital. To identify the e↵ect of   separately from the need for capital, we include
controls for two industry-level measures of need for capital described in Rajan & Zingales (1998). The
first is external capital dependence, defined as Cap Ex+Cash Flow from OperationsCap Ex and computed using all US
Compustat firms over the period 2003-2010.16
Industry Chinese import intensity. To account for competitive threats from external sources,
we control for Chinese import intensity measured at the industry-country-year level computed following
the procedure detailed in Bloom et al. (2016).
Innovation. One can imagine that an industry’s level of innovativeness could be correlated with both
entry and the di culty of substituting labor for capital. To absorb the e↵ects of industry innovativeness
that don’t operate through factor substitutability, we control for it using two measures. Industry R&D
intensity is R&D spending over sales. For each industry, we compute the average ratio of R&D expen-
ditures to sales from Compustat firms prior to the beginning of our sample to avoid contaminating our
results with shocks that can a↵ect both the incentives to invest in R&D and entry rates. The correlation
between   and R&D intensity is 0.21; that is, more R&D-intensive industries are associated with a greater
ease of substituting capital with labor. Industry patent intensity is defined as the ratio of total number of
USPTO patents to R&D stock and is computed for US Compustat firms over the period 2003-2010. The
correlation between patent intensity and   is -0.29. That is, stronger protection of intellectual property
rights is associated with a greater di culty in substituting capital with labor (and vice versa).
16In the Compustat data, we measure cash flow from operations as the sum of APALCH, INVCH, OANCF, and RECCH.
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Analysis
The unit of observation is the country-industry-year triplet and the dependent variable is the natural log
of 1 plus the number of firms incorporated in each year-country-industry. Our sample is an unbalanced
panel of 126 four-digit industry NAICS codes in 19 countries over the period 2003-2010. Based on these,
the total number of observations—country-industry-year combinations—where there is at least one active
firm is 20,894.
Our empirical approach is to compare the di↵erence-in-di↵erences between entry into industries with
di↵erent levels of factor substitutability   in countries with di↵erent levels of EPL rigidity. Table 2
illustrates our empirical approach, using comparisons of mean rates of entry. This table includes examples
of industries with high and low elasticity of substitution and the percentage of entrants for each industry
for countries with high and low EPL. The table illustrates the expected higher entry rate for low-EPL
countries as well as the expected e↵ect of EPL being larger for high-  industries. With this simple
comparison, our predictions are borne out.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Next, we turn to non-parametric tests of our predictions of firms’ experimentation. The model de-
scribed the exploratory strategy as entering with a more labor-intensive production process, but suggested
that this might be less e cient in the long run. This thinking yielded the following predictions. On av-
erage, entrants will enter with lower capital-to-labor ratios. That e↵ect will be less pronounced in high
EPL countries and will be more pronounced in high-  settings, where firms are able to replace labor with
capital. Table 3 presents the results of the non-parametric tests for experimentation. As in Table 2, Col-
umn (1) corresponds to a simple di↵erence-in-di↵erences comparison. We find that the magnitude of the
di↵erence in capital intensity between entrants and incumbents is notably higher in low-  industries. We
add a third di↵erence in Column (4) that compares the di↵erence-in-di↵erences between strong and weak
EPL regimes. We find that the di↵erence between incumbents and entrants is attenuated in strong-EPL
countries.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Finally, we test the prediction from Hypothesis 5 that entry by corporate a liates is less a↵ected by
labor rigidity, factor substitutability and uncertainty. Table 4 presents raw percentages of firms that are
entrants by di↵erent categories. Comparing across categories, we can see that the percentage of corporate
group a liated entrants varies much less than that of standalone entrants both across levels of   and levels
of uncertainty. For example, comparing the di↵erence between calls (1).A and 2.(A), which represents the
increase in entry attributable to   in high uncertainty environments is an increase of about 43 percent.
The di↵erence between (3).A and (4).A, on the other hand, corresponds to a smaller decrease of about
10 percent.
[Insert Table 4 here]
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From the nonparametric tests, we proceed to multivariate regression tests. Our baseline econometric
specification is:
ln(Entrants)ijt = ↵1EPLi + ↵2 i ⇥ EPLjt + ↵3 i + 'j + ⌧t + ✏ijt (2)
where i denotes four-digit industry NAICS, j denotes country, and t denotes time. 'j and ⌧t are complete
sets of country and year dummies, respectively, and ✏ijt is an iid error term. Because including dummies
at the industry level would wash out the e↵ect of  , we include controls at the industry level. The most
basic of these, present in all of our specifications, is a baseline control for the size of the industry in
the country. Because there are time-invariant features of an industry that would make it larger but are
unrelated to  , we include a control for the log of 1 plus the number of firms in the country-industry in
year t-1.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that entry will decrease with rigid labor (↵ˆ1 < 0). In Table 5 column (1),
we see this prediction is borne out. Hypothesis 1 also predicts that this e↵ect is amplified by factor
substitutability (↵ˆ2 < 0). That prediction is borne out in column (2) and shown to be robust to replacing
the elasticity of substitution measure with industry fixed e↵ects (column(3)), interaction controls (column
(4)), and replacing the country EPL score with country fixed e↵ects (column(5)). Columns (6) and
(7) repeat the model but with only standalone or group a liates counted in the dependent variable,
respectively. These results suggest that e↵ect of   is much greater for standalone than group-a liated
firms, as is the interaction of   with EPL. While the marginal e↵ect of EPL seems similar for standalone
and group a liates, when we compute the marginal e↵ect including the interaction at the   sample
average, we find that the e↵ect is greater for standalones17 than group-a liates18, as predicted.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Next, we move to predictions about the capital-labor ratio. The samples used in Table 6 include only
the year of entry for each firm, to investigate their capital-labor ratio at entry. Hypothesis 2 predicts that
the labor-intensive strategy will be less likely under labor rigidity. In Table 6 column (1) we can see that
under high EPL—rigid labor, firms are more likely to enter with greater capital balances. Hypothesis 2
also predicts that use of the exploratory strategy will be increasing in factor substitutability, which we
also see in column (1). We can also see in the higher labor balance associated with higher  . We see
in column (2) that the tendency to the exploratory strategy is greatest under both flexible labor and
substitutable factors. Column (3) shows that this e↵ect is robust to inclusion of country dummies instead
of just the EPL score.
In columns (4) and (5) we divide the sample into standalone and group-a liated firms. Comparing
the coe cients on   shows that its e↵ect is primarily driven by standalone firms.
[Insert Table 6 here]
17 0.29 + 0.22⇥ 0.674 =  0.438
18 0.306 + 0.22⇥ 0.041 =  0.315
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Table 7 includes all years of data, instead of just the entry year, for firms that entered at the beginning
of the sample, in 2002 or 2003. This allows us to observe these new firms as they grow. We add an
interaction of   with firm age to show how firms exploit factor substitutability as they grow. This allows
us to test the prediction of Hypothesis 3 that firms will be more likely to begin with the labor-intensive
strategy, but will gradually adopt more capital-intensive production to become e cient once demand is
realized. From column (1) we see that firms seem to enter with more labor-intensive production in high
  settings, but the interaction with age shows that they become more capital intensive as they age. In
column (2) we show that this e↵ect is robust to inclusion of firm fixed e↵ects.
Hypothesis 6 predicts that group a liates are on average more capital-intensive than standalone firms,
and their capital-labor ratios change less over their life cycle. We observe the average e↵ect in comparing
the sample averages of columns (3) and (4), which show higher capital intensity for group a liates on
average. We observe the e↵ect over time by comparing the coe cient on the  ⇥ age interaction between
those two columns. What we see is that standalone firms begin with lower levels of capital, but ramp up
more over time when factors are substitutable.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the labor-intensive production technology will be more prevalent when
uncertainty is high. In columns (5) and (6) we divide the sample by level of media uncertainty using the
data from Baker et al. (2016). Comparing the sample averages in columns (5) and (6), we can see that on
average firms facing lower uncertainty have more capital-intensive production. Comparing the interaction
of elasticity of substitution and firm age, we see that when labor and capital are exchangeable, firms in
high uncertainty areas gradually increase their capital intensiveness. Firms in the low uncertainty areas
show little evidence of substituting over time.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Concluding remarks
Markets for many production inputs, including labor, are becoming more flexible. In many countries,
employment protection rights have been reduced and it is now far easier to use temporary contracts.
Online intermediaries such as TaskRabbit, Tispr, UpWork, and Wonolo are also making it easier to match
tasks that firms want to perform with independent, “on-demand” contractors willing to perform them.
The rise of this “gig” or “freelancer” economy is widely regarded as one of the most important current
workplace trends (e.g., Economist, 2014; Forbes, 2016a,b). Furthermore, platforms to provide computing
on demand, like Amazon Web Service and Microsoft Azure, are making some capital expenditures more
flexible.
The increasing flexibility of inputs is also likely to a↵ect the organization of production in profound
ways. Building on real options theory, the present paper investigates, both theoretically and empirically,
the impact of greater input flexibility on one fundamental strategic issue—the propensity to start a
business. Real options theory suggests that business creation is hampered when investment is irreversible
and uncertainty is pervasive (Myers, 1977; Dixit, 1989, 1992; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Kogut, 1991; Miller &
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Folta, 2002; Bloom, 2009; Trigeorgis & Reuer, 2017). The threshold return or “hurdle” rate that justifies
an investment is higher if the investment cannot be recovered or can only be terminated at a cost if
conditions turn out to be less favorable than initially thought.
We present a model of a prospective firm’s decision to enter an industry under uncertainty. Building
on real options theory, our model formalizes how uncertainty interacting with irreversibility of decisions
can be a major barrier to entry. This paper contributes by proposing an answer to the question of how
firms overcome this barrier. We suggest that prospective firms may be able to follow two strategies to
overcome rigidity of input choices. One is to temporarily substitute rigid inputs with less rigid inputs,
even if it is ine cient, while they realize uncertain demand. A second is to enter as an a liate of a larger
organization which can transfer resources between divisions.
Several papers stress the importance of manufacturing or operations flexibility. By starting small
and preserving an option to grow, a firm can gain valuable information about market demand, especially
in the initial stages of a product life cycle (McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Bollen, 1999; Ries, 2011). A
flexible technology also helps the firm serve customers early on when demand is more uncertain, while
postponing more specialized investment for later. Operations flexibility includes the ability to quickly and
inexpensively change product mix, input combinations, or the location of production facilities (Kulatilaka,
1993; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Goyal & Netessine, 2007). With ever-increasing product variety and
shorter product life spans, flexibility–particularly in the introduction of new products–is becoming a
crucial source of competitive advantage (Gopal et al., 2013). The present paper highlights the role of
factor substitutability in reducing the adverse e↵ects of input rigidity and allowing firms to cheaply carry
out “experiments”.
The literature on entrepreneurial experimentation (e.g., Thomke, 2003; Manso, 2011; Kerr et al.,
2014; Nanda & Rhodes-Kropf, 2016) also notes that, because most experiments fail, organizations and
new products should be designed so that they can fail as inexpensively as possible. A crucial parameter in
the calculus of whether to experiment or not is the cost of experimentation. Thomke (2003), in particular,
notes that new technologies, including computer modeling and simulation, have dramatically reduced the
cost of experimentation, thus radically changing the economics of experimentation. The paper suggests
that legislative reforms and technological innovation, by making labor markets more flexible, may also
have had a positive impact on experimentation and entrepreneurship19. This positive e↵ect will, of course,
have to be weighed against the potential drawbacks of labor flexibility, such as job insecurity (Davis, 2016).
Labor is not the only input that is becoming more flexible. Companies such as Amazon, Microsoft
and Salesforce.com are making software, databases, platforms and infrastructure a scalable, cloud-based
“service”. To the extent that these services can be used to substitute for either labor or capital (or both),
the model suggests that cloud computing may have a large e↵ect on business creation. This e↵ect may
be large not just when demand is uncertain, but also when demand is cyclical or just temporary.
Organization structure can also help mitigate rigidities in input markets and encourage experimenta-
tion. The rise in collaborative ventures and strategic alliances can, to some extent, be attributed to the
19Foote & Folta (2003) is a very relevant paper, as it deals with the increasingly important phenomenon of temporary
workers (and hence flexible labor) from a real options perspective.
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ability of these organizations to postpone commitment and flexibly deal with uncertainty (e.g., Kogut,
1991; Folta & Miller, 2002). The second strategy we highlight—internal market flexibility—provides a
potential reason for why another organizational form, the corporate group, is so widespread. Groups
are able to deal with uncertainty better than standalone firms thanks to the flexibility provided by their
internal markets.
The strategy literature also highlights the ability of multinational corporations (MNC) to deal with
uncertainty, but largely focuses on their ability to flexibly move production across borders in response
to changing economic conditions, such as fluctuations in exchange rates (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994).
We emphasize the flexibility to change inputs and the flexibility to redeploy resources across units more
generally, which may or may not involve moving production across borders (Folta et al., 2016). Consistent
with this, Kim and Hung (2017) find that, after an increase in uncertainty, firms using less redeployable
capital reduce investment more.
The model brings to the real options and entrepreneurial experimentation literatures the particular
feature of predicting dynamic entry strategies where firms begin with one labor-capital mixture and
adjust as demand is revealed. In this sense, it shares the flavor of industry lifecycle models in which
economies of scale become endogenously more important over time and attention shifts to the e ciency
of the production process (Klepper, 1996). While those models predict an evolution of strategies across
an industry over the industry lifecycle, our model predicts heterogeneous strategies across firms within
an industry based on their age. Empirically, we include industry-fixed e↵ects in our specifications (which
should absorb industry maturity given the short time dimension in our data) and show that labor-to-
capital ratio is di↵erent for new entrants than incumbents. Rothschild & Stiglitz (1971), Holthausen
(1976), Hartman (1976), and Ghosal (1991) also study the relationship between demand uncertainty and
input choices. Holthausen (1976), for example, shows that risk-averse firms tend to use a production
process with low fixed costs and high variable costs and use expected capital-labor ratios less than the
e cient ratio. This meshes well with our findings but, again, our focus is on how di↵erent levels of input
rigidities a↵ect production and input choices, not on levels of risk aversion.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on rigidities and performance. Summarizing this vast
literature is well outside the scope of this paper. Broadly speaking, however, it has two main strands.
Archetypical studies in the first strand discuss how particular firm rigidities impact firm performance.
For example, Bennett & Pierce (2016) suggest that agency problems associated with multi-divisional
firms keep divisions from being able to reconfigure themselves to deter entrants. Christensen & Bower
(1996) suggest that large successful firms are unable to reconfigure themselves to face new business
models because they are overly structured to responding to the needs of existing customers, rather than
potential customers. The second strand investigates what firms can do to make themselves less rigid.
This can include establishing R&D capacity to be able to understand new technologies as they arise
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) or mixing inexperienced employees who have not yet formed rigid routines
with experienced sta↵ (Lawrence, 2018). Broadly, the ability to reconfigure the firm has been given the
name “dynamic capabilities” (Teece et al., 1997). We complement this research by describing a new
feature of firm rigidities: their ability to a↵ect experimentation and, by extension, entry.
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The paper has a number of limitations. The model is very simple and hence abstracts from several
important factors such as multiple periods, switching costs, and the e↵ects of competition on technology
choice (Bollen, 1999; Smit & Trigeorgis, 2017; Kulatilaka, 1988). The simplicity of the model, however,
allows us to transparently illustrate the key relationships investigated in the data.
Regarding the empirical part, the results provide robust correlations motivated by theoretical analysis
but fall short of proving causality. In particular, the negative correlation between firm entry and employ-
ment protection legislation could be driven by a number of country-level factors that are not captured
by control variables. The interaction e↵ects and the firm lifecycle results provide additional evidence in
support of specific mechanisms, but further research, perhaps relying on a natural experimental setting
such as that in Bornha¨ll et al. (2017), is certainly needed.
To conclude, we present a simple model of entry and investment under uncertainty. We examine two
strategies that prospective firms may use to overcome rigidity of input choices. One is to temporarily
substitute rigid capital with less rigid labor. The second is to enter as an a liate of a larger organization.
As political and technological changes make workers more likely to be available “on demand”, our model
suggests that capital irreversibility will become a less binding barrier in industries (i) where labor and
capital are substitutable and (ii) entry by standalone (single-unit) firms is predominant.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Possible scenarios
cL = 0 cL = c
cK = 0
Scenario 1:
Both capital and labor are flexible
Scenario 2:
Capital is flexible but labor is rigid
cK = c
Scenario 3:
Capital is rigid but labor is flexible
Scenario 4:
Both capital and labor are rigid
Entrants per country
(14190.5,297875]
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(1.5,381.5]
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Figure 2: Entrants by country in sample
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Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 10th 50th 90th
Panel A: Industry-country-year information 
Elasticity of substitution (σ) 20,894 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.37
Number of entrants 20,894 82 748 0 1 87
Number of standalone entrants 20,894 48 410 0 1 47
Number of group affiliate entrants 20,894 34 429 0 0 27
Total number of firms 20,894 2,051 10,331 5 208 4,045
Employment protection index 20,894 2.5 0.6 1.5 2.4 3.1
Flexibility in hiring and firing workers 20,894 2.8 1.0 1.3 3.0 4.0
Rigidity of wage setting 20,894 4.3 0.9 3.2 4.5 5.1
Dismissal procedures 20,192 2.0 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.8
Industry uncertainty 15,193 0.15 0.07 0 0.13 0.22
Industry financial dependence 20,894 1.19 2.06 0 0.61 2.37
Industry external capital dependence 20,894 -0.01 5.82 -10 0 8.45
Chinese import penetration 20,894 0.06 0.07 0 0.03 0.14
Industry R&D intensity 20,894 0.03 0.10 0 0 0.05
Industry patent intensity 20,894 0.22 1.26 0 0 0.04
EPL country 20,894 2.4 0.6 1.4 2.4 3.0
EPL component measures
  Mean length of notice for severance 20,894 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.8
  Mean difficulty of dismissal 20,894 2.8 1.0 1.3 3.1 4.3
  Mean procedural inconvenience 20,894 2.6 0.7 1.5 2.5 3.5
Alternate Elasticity of substitution (σ) measures
  Young (2013) 16,661 0.47 0.12 0 0.44 0.61
  Griliches et al.  (1971) 10,456 1.07 0.24 1 0.99 1.43
GDP 20,894 35,303.83 7,847.66 26,209 34,924 43,669.03
Unemployment rate 20,894 7.22 2.79 4 7.53 10.50
Uncertainty in the media 9,364 104.63 10.61 91.89 102.42 124.63
Panel B: firm-level information (firm-year) for firms incorporated in the first year of the sample (2003)
Assets ('000) 692,561 4,746 156,841 54 312 2,546
Employees 692,561 31 1,859 1 3 19
Assets per employee ('000) 692,561 157 182 20 89 395
Firm age 47,132,167 4 2 1 4 7
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Main Variables
Distribution
Notes: This table provides summary statistics on the main variables used in the analysis. In Panel A the unit of observation is a naics4-year-country triplet, and 
in Panel B the unit of observation is a firm-year pair. Monteray values are in USD.
(1) (2) (3)
Countries with low EPL Countries with high EPL (1) minus (2)
Waste Management and Remediation Services (562) 1.2 0.1 1.1
Utilities (221) 6.5 2.8 3.7
Highway, Street, and Bridge Construction (2373) 3.5 0.1 3.4
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services (541) 2.2 0.2 2.0
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (336) 0.9 0.1 0.8
Food Manufacturing (311) 0.6 0.2 0.4
Plastics and Rubber Products (326) 0.5 0.1 0.4
Printing and Related Support Activities (323) 0.7 0.1 0.6
Paper Manufacturing (322) 0.4 0.1 0.3
Apparel Manufacturing (315) 0.7 0.1 0.6
Textile Mills (313) 0.3 0.0 0.3
Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing (316) 0.6 0.0 0.6
Table 2. Percentage of Entrants in High- and Low-σ Industries by EPL
Panel A: Examples of high-σ industries (% of entrants)
Panel B: Examples of low-σ industries (% of entrants)
Notes: This table presents patterns of entry in selected industries with high (top quartile) and low (lowest quartile) elasticity of substitution, in countries with high (above
median) and low (below median) EPL. Columns 1 and 2 present the percentage of entrants by industry and country. Column 3 presents the difference between the percentage
of entrants in countries with low and high EPL.
Difference by EPL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Industry elasticity of substitution (σ): All countries Weak EPL countries Strong EPL countries   (2) minus (3)
A. 1st tertile -44,729 -29,908 -30,324 416
B. 2nd tertile -55,553 -58,224 -58.182 -42
C. 3rd tertile -74,668 -81,880 -58,457 -23,423
D. (C) minus (A) -29,939 -51,972 -28,223 -23,749
Table 3. Non-Parametric Relationship of Assets per Employee with σ and EPL
Notes: This table presents differences in assets per employee for entrants vs. incumbent firms by σ and EPL. Row D is the difference by high and low σ in the 
difference in assets per employee between entrants and incumbents. Our theory predicts the difference in assets per employee to rise with σ. Our theory predicts 
that D would be larger for weak EPL countries. 
Entrants' assets per employee minus incumbents' assets per employee
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uncertainty High σ (>median) Low σ (≤median) High σ (>median) Low σ (≤median)
A. Below median (inclusive) 0.030 0.043 0.040 0.036
B. Above median 0.061 0.052 0.038 0.040
Notes: This table presents difference in entry rates by standalone and group affiliated firms across industry σ and country 
EPL by uncertainty levels. Our theory predicts that higher uncertainty would raise entry rates by standalone firms when σ 
is high. 
Table 4. Non-Parametric Relationship of share of entrants with uncertainty, σ, and EPL
Group affiliate entryStandalone entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Baseline
σ-EPL 
interaction
Industry 
FEs
Interaction 
controls
Country 
FEs
Entry by 
standalone 
firms
Entry by 
group 
affiliates
Industry elasticity of substitution × EPL -0.724 -0.761 -1.107 -0.722 -0.674 -0.041
(0.286) (0.265) (0.313) (0.237) (0.268) (0.159)
Industry elasticity of substitution (σ) 0.913 2.663 - - - 2.364 0.847
(0.167) (0.695) (0.640) (0.432)
Country EPL -0.679 -0.522 -0.504 -0.420 - -0.290 -0.306
(0.038) (0.08) (0.061) (0.073) (0.062) (0.044)
Industry elasticity of substition × ln(GDP) -2.117 1.392
(1.028) (0.487)
Industry elasticity of substition × 
Unemployment rate -0.077 -0.023
(0.043) (0.034)
ln(GDP) 0.593 0.570 0.841 1.359 4.157 0.754 -0.893
(0.146) (0.146) (0.128) (0.290) (0.350) (0.137) (0.061)
Unemployment rate -0.004 -0.004 0.008 0.025 0.104 0.003 -0.032
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.106) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003)
Industry capital intensity 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.013
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
Industry external capital dependence 0.009 0.009 0.007 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Industry chinese import -0.764 -0.750 -1.056 1.119
(0.361) (0.358) (0.373) (0.294)
Industry R&D Intensity -0.026 -0.029 -0.034 0.016
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Industry patent intensity 0.150 0.151 0.128 0.001
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.013)
ln(1+Firms in country-NAICS4)t-1 -0.487 -0.487 -0.524 -0.522 -0.490 -0.540 -0.054
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-digit industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes No No
Country dummies No No No No Yes No No
S.E. clustered at Country ×	NAICS4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.561 0.561 0.588 0.589 0.674 0.598 0.119
Observations 18,221 18,221 18,221 18,221 18,221 18,221 18,221
Table 5. Effect of Factor Substitutability and Employment Protection on Entry
Dependent variable: ln(No. entrants/Total number of firms)
Note: This table examines the effect of industry elasticity of substitution and country employment protection laws (EPL) on entry. Higher EPL values 
indicate that employment protection is more strict. Unit of observation is country-NAICS4-year triplet over the sample period 2003-2010.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Entry year
σ-EPL 
interaction Country FEs Standalones
Group 
affiliates
Industry elasticity of substitution (σ) -0.639 -1.558 -1.867 -3.744 -0.988
(0.037) (0.307) (0.305) (0.464) (0.396)
EPL 0.345 0.261 - - -
(0.015) (0.031)
Industry elasticity of substitution × 
EPL 0.311 0.409 0.98 0.150
(0.102) (0.101) (0.158) (0.128)
ln(Employees) -0.085 -0.085 -0.124 -0.331 -0.046
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
ln(GDP) 3.514 3.52 0.551 1.473 -0.948
(0.051) (0.051) (0.234) (0.288) (0.339)
Unemployment rate 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.018
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No No Yes Yes
Firm FEs No No No No No
Assets/Employee sample average 
('000) 110 110 110 100 120
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs No No No No No
Observations 172,814 172,814 172,814 90,516 82,298
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.11
Table 6. Factor Substitution and Capital Intensity 
Dependent variable: ln(Assets/Employees)
Note: This table examines the relationship between σ and EPL with assets intensity and how this relationship 
changes as firms mature. Columns 1-5 include only the year of entry.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
σ-Age 
interaction Within-firm Standalones
Group 
affiliates
High media 
uncertainty 
(highest 
quartile)
Low media 
uncertainty 
(lowest 
quartile)
Industry elasticity of substitution × 
Firm age 0.136 0.067 0.092 0.030 0.121 -0.005
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.023) (0.052)
Industry elasticity of substitution (σ) -0.994 - - - - -
(0.245)
EPL 0.253 - - - - -
(0.025)
Industry elasticity of substitution × 
EPL 0.198 - - - - -
(0.082)
ln(Employees) -0.088 -0.614 -0.655 -0.576 -0.526 -0.781
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.016)
Firm age 0.024
(0.006)
ln(GDP) 2.444 2.154 2.428 2.059 3.06 2.317
(0.041) (0.067) (0.089) (0.092) (0.258) (0.428)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.039 0.023
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.009)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FEs No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies No - - - - -
Assets/Employee sample average 
('000) 160 160 140 180 154 159
Observations 692,561 692,561 692,561 692,561 153,442 128,539
R-squared 0.06 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.98
Note: This table examines the relationship between σ and EPL with assets intensity and examine the how relationship changes as 
firms mature.  The sample includes only firms that were incorporated in the first year of our sample (2003) and tracks how their 
capital intensity changes as they mature.
Table 7. Factor Substitution and Capital Intensity Over Time
Dependent variable: ln(Assets/Employees)
